The New York Times conducted an analysis of the second part of the
Deepwater Horizon disaster. The first part was the blowout. The second
was the destruction of the rig. Based on interviews of people who
survived plus recorded testimony of most of the survivors, the Times
asked why the disaster happened when the rig had very sophisticated
safety systems with up-to-date training.
The Times concluded, "The paralysis had two main sources, the
examination by The Times shows. The first was a failure to train for the
worst. The Horizon was like a Gulf Coast town that regularly rehearsed
for Category 1 hurricanes but never contemplated the hundred-year storm.
The crew members, though expert in responding to the usual range of
well problems, were unprepared for a major blowout followed by
explosions, fires and a total loss of power."
"They were also frozen by the sheer complexity of the Horizon’s
defenses, and by the policies that explained when they were to be
deployed. One emergency system alone was controlled by 30 buttons."
These are certainly lessons for us all to consider as we evaluate our
safety systems. I know that technology developers and users have been
studying the problem for a long time. We have the Center for Operator
Performance, Abnormal Situation Consortium and Human-Centered Design. We
have improved simulation and training. Are these enough? Are we
implementing them smartly? What else do we need to do?Feed Forward Bloghttp://www.garymintchellsfeedforward.com/